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Under the leadership of Chairman Wilbur Mills and the House
Ways and Means Committee, Congress, on December 10, 1969, en-
acted massive and controversial tax legislation.' Portions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 manifested 'a clear anticonglomerate policy; key
proponents of tax reform believed that tax advantages encouraged
corporate consolidations which otherwise lacked economic justifica-
tion.2 Consequently many of these advantages were eliminated.
With the lion's share of publicity focused on reform of the tax
treatment of debt-financed acquisitions, little attention was paid to
the Act's revision of stock dividend treatment under § 305 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 3 Section 305 extended to the Treasury broad
authority to establish by regulation constructive stock dividend taxa-
tion of preferred stock carrying a redemption premium, generically
referred to as "discounted preferred." 4 Discounted preferred stock
bears functional similarity to original issue discount debt-debt which
is issued at a price below maturity value and generally pays a stated
amount of interest which is less than prevailing rates. As part of its
anticonglomerate package, Congress revised the taxation of such in-
debtedness, requiring debtholders to realize as income a pro rata
amount of the discount each year. Section 1232, the relevant provi-
sion of the Code, had previously allowed original issue discount bond-
1. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 610 [hereinafter cited as the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 or as the Act].
2. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 101-03 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP.]; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 146-48 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP.].
3. See, e.g., Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Mfeans, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 5512 (1969) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen,
Ass't Sec. of the Treasury for Tax Policy). See generally Bittker, Proposed Legislative
Restrictions on Acquisitions of Stock by Conglomerate Corporations, 30 J. TAx. 354
(1969); Thrower, Conglomerates-Some Tax Problems, 25 Bus. LAW. 641 (1970).
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)(1) (1973) gives a precise description: This is stock "which
may be redeemed [by the issuing corporation] after a specified period of time at a price
higher than the issue price...." Note that such preferred stock, according to this def-
inition, does not necessarily bear a mandatory redemption provision.
Prior to the 1969 revisions of § 1232, the holders of debt instruments which were
issued at a price below the amount paid at maturity did not pay income tax on the
amount of the discount until the instrument matured or was disposed of. See S. REP.,
supra note 2, at 146. Additionally, § 1232 was revised to regularize tax treatment of
bondholders and corporate issuers. Before this revision the issuer took a ratable annual
interest deduction while the holder delayed tax liability.
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holders to delay tax liability until the maturity or disposition of the
bond.'
Congress' desire to tax the redemption premium on discounted
preferred stock may be understood on two policy grounds. First, as
Congress stated in its commentary on the Act, the premium does
in some respects resemble a constructive stock dividend which has
a disproportionate effect with respect to all equityholders. It has long
been the policy of § 305(b) to tax disproportionate stock dividends.,
Second, it may be inferred from the similarity of new § 305 rules
to the taxation of original issue discount debt under § 1232 that
Congress wished to provide a backstop which would block access to
former discounted debt results by the use of discounted preferred
stock.
In the portion of the committee reports covering the § 305 reforms,
Congress, elaborated on its desired revision of the taxation of discounted
preferred stock by offering but one example which presents only nar-
row and uncomplicated technical problems.1 The subsequent, rather
vague Treasury regulationss under that section, adopted July 11,
1973, do not venture beyond Congress' narrow concept of this sort
of stock. They require that the taxpayer include in gross income
annually a ratable portion of the difference between the redemption
price and issue price (less a "reasonable" call premium for premature
redemption, presumed not to exceed 10 percent of issue price) over
the period of time before the date on which the preferred stock may
by agreement be redeemed by the issuing corporation.
Both Congress and the Treasury have failed to recognize, however,
that very different kinds of preferred stock "may be redeemed" at a
premium at some point after issuance. Some issue agreements provide
only that the corporation has an option to redeem at the stated price;
whether it exercises the option will depend on economic conditions
and the company's success in the intervening years. If the company
fares poorly, the stockholder may never realize his premium. Other
issues, however, provide for varying degrees of mandatory redemption
at the premium price. The regulations are written to cover both
types, but they really fit only the second.
Therefore the assumption underlying the taxation of discounted
preferred stock-that an increase in redemption value necessarily gives
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a)(3), as amended by Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-172, § 413(a), 83 Stat. 610.
6. The proportionate interest test is discussed at length at p. 328 infra.
7. See note 10 infra.
8. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.305-1(c), 1.305-5 to -8 (1973).
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a constructive stock dividend-is a generalization which cuts too broad
a swath through the field of discounted preferred stock issues. It
may be valid to analogize discounted preferred stock to original issue
discount indebtedness where the issuer of the preferred stock is com-
pelled to redeem at a specific date, and a sinking fund supports the
redemption. However, a corporation's privilege of redemption is not
the equivalent of a bondholder's power to demand repayment upon
maturity.
In taxing the premium on preferred stock indiscriminately in a
manner similar to the taxation of interest on original issue discount
indebtedness under § 1232 of the Code, the new § 305 regulations suf-
fer from excessive simplicity. One consequence of this simplicity is
confused application of the new constructive stock dividend rules to
mergers and acquisitions. Issuance of discounted preferred stock is
typical during corporate reorganization; in mergers and acquisitions
preferred stock is most useful in reshaping ownership interests in
a newly consolidated enterprise. It is therefore surprising that § 305
regulations do not specifically address tax-free reorganizations under
§§ 368(a)(1)(B) and (C) of the Code. When the § 305 stock dividend
rules, such as they are, are applied to discounted preferred stock
issued during a merger or acquisition, tax liabilities result which are
at best confusing, and are at worst in conflict with longstanding tax
policy.
Section 1232 of the Code, the apparent analogue to the new § 305
discounted preferred rules, is rich in technical provision. By con-
trast, the § 305 regulations lack technical detail; they do not treat
problems such as cost basis adjustment or allocation of tax liability
in conjunction with a preredemption sale, problems which will in-
evitably arise in application.
The § 1232 analogy suggests that the simplicity of § 305 regulations
could be cured by importation of original issue discount debt pro-
visions into the scheme of taxing stock dividends. However, analogy
to § 1232 highlights the third and most basic flaw of the § 305 regu-
lations: By converting original issue discount debt concepts into con-
structive stock dividend rules, the new regulations fail to comport
with the realities of relative risk or security which underlie the debt-
equity distinction.9 Each of these flaws will appear in clearer relief
as we proceed.
9. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 83 n.a (1972):
Technically the claim of the debt is an obligation, since it represents an uncondi-
tional promise to pay principal and interest, which on default may be enforced by
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I. The New § 305 Provisions
The congressional committees which were responsible for drafting
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 clearly expressed the need to extend
constructive stock dividend treatment to discounted preferred. Both
House and Senate committee reports stated that where preferred paid
no dividend, but would be redeemed after a definite period of time
at a substantial premium over the issue price, the redemption pre-
mium should be taken into income on a pro rata, annual basis by
treating the premium as a distribution of stock.'0
Discounted preferred stock is covered by § 305(b)(4), added to the
Code in 1969, which states that any distribution on preferred stock
(other than antidilution increases of the conversion ratio of con-
vertible preferred) is a distribution of property to which § 301 ap-
plies, generally meaning that it will be taxed as ordinary income."
Section 305(c) adds that the Treasury may prescribe regulations un-
der which a redemption premium will be deemed a distribution on
preferred stock. Given this broad language and the extensive powers
thus delegated to the Treasury, the scope of subsequent regulations
under § 305 is not surprising. Section 1.305-5(b)(1) states the basic rule:
If a corporation issues preferred stock which may be redeemed
after a specified period of time at a price higher than the issue
price, the difference will be considered under the authority of
section 305(c) to be a distribution of additional stock on pre-
ferred stock which is constructively received by the shareholder
over the period of time during which the preferred stock cannot
be called for redemption.
the creditor. In contrast, the preferred stock's claim is only a priority embodied in
a negative covenant, which becomes enforceable only if the commons or other
juniors seek to distribute earnings or assets to themselves.
Note that this comparison between debt and equity supports the quintessential dis-
tinction: In terms of investment risk, debt offers a substantially higher comparative level
of safety. It is a risk factor which classically distinguishes between debt and equity.
10. The Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee both
referred to discounted preferred directly in their reports:
Methods have also been devised to give preferred stockholders the equivalent of
dividends on preferred stock which are not taxable as such under present law. For
example, a corporation may issue preferred stock for $100 per share which pays no
dividends, but which may be redeemed in 20 years for $200. The effect is the same
as if the corporation distributed preferred stock equal to 5 percent of the original
stock each year during the 20-year period in lieu of cash dividends. The committee
believes that dividends paid on preferred stock should be taxed whether they are
received in cash or in another form, such as stock, rights to receive stock, or rights
to receive an increased amount on redemption.
S. RuP., supra note 2, at 151 (emphasis added). See H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 114.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(c), 316, generally provide that a dividend distribu-
tion out of earnings and profits is includable in gross income. Distributions in excess of
earnings and profits axe applied against cost basis, with any further excess over basis
taxed as gain from the sale or exchange of property.
327
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 324, 1974
Clearly, discounted preferred stock will result in dividend income to
its holders to the extent of the discount, even where redemption is
merely permissive and not mandatory.
12
In characterizing the redemption premium on discounted preferred
stock as a constructive dividend, the regulations superficially comport
with fundamental concepts of stock dividend taxation. When a share-
holder receives a stock dividend which "merely gives each stockholder
more pieces of paper to represent the same interest in the corpora-
tion,"'13 the dividend is not taxable. 14 Section 305(a) thus introduces
the tax provisions for stock dividends with the general rule that a
dividend of stock on stock is not generally a taxable occasion. How-
ever, a stock dividend has long been considered taxable if it effects
a disproportionate distribution of the assets of the corporation to the
stockholders. Section 305(b) carves out exceptions to the general rule
of nontaxability based on the rationale that the described exceptions
result in disproportionate increases in certain stockholders' interests.
Stock dividends are therefore measured against the longstanding "pro-
portionate interest test,"'1 now codified as § 305(b),1' to determine
whether they may give rise to ordinary income.
12. A reasonable redemption premium will not result in dividend income. Treas. Reg.
§ l.305-5(b)(2) (1973). This Regulation states that a redemption premium is "reasonable"
if it is in the nature of a penalty for premature redemption of the preferred stock, not
exceeding "the amount the corporation would be required to pay for the right to make
such premature redemption under market conditions existing at the time of issuance."
While this suggests that the premium would not be available in a situation where an
early redemption is planned and therefore a penalty for corporate action is inappropriate,
the examples given lead one to conclude that this exception will be applied automatically
to any sort of redemption. A premium of 10 percent of issue price where the corporation
may not redeem for at least five years is cited as reasonable. While the examples given
apply a 10 percent exception mechanically, there are implications that if it could be
established that the market justified a higher premium, it would be accepted. Basically,
the new § 305 provisions apply only to stock distributions made after January 10, 1969.
Treas. Reg. § 1.305-8 (1973) gives detailed transitional rules.
13. S. REP., supra note 2, at 150. See generally Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
(the classic stock dividend case).
14. The additional pieces of paper could, of course, represent an increase in the
amount of earned surplus in the earnings and profit account of the issuing corporation.
But even if no stock dividend had been declared to reflect such an increase, the earned
surplus of the corporation would belong to the stockholders in the same proportion as if
a stock dividend had been declared.
15. The proportionate interest test was first suggested by the Supreme Court in
Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936). See Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
For more extensive reviews of the history of the taxation of stock dividends, see Eustice,
Corporations and Corporate Investors, 25 TAx L. REv. 590 (1970); Note, An Analysis of
the Taxation of Stock Dividends from 1918 to 1970, 8 DuQ. L. Rx-v. 364 (1970).
16. The "Citizens Utility Plan" is an example of an attempt to achieve a dispro-
portionate dividend of stock on stock without ordinary income consequences which is now
disallowed by § 305(b) and regulations under this section. The Citizens Utility Company
reorganized its common into two classes. Class A holders would receive an annual
dividend in common stock, while class B holders received cash. Class A stock was con-
vertible into class B, but B could not be converted. For the pecuniary ramifications of
this device, see Lowrimore, Two Classes of Stock: One Gets Cash, One Stock Dividends:
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Section 1.305-7(a) of the Treasury Regulations details the impact of
the proportionate interest test on preferred stock by demonstrating the
Treasury's view that a constructive dividend on discounted preferred
stock is disproportionate with respect to other shareholders (for ex-
ample, holders of common stock), and is therefore a taxable distribution
of corporate assets. The ordinary income result mandated by the new
regulations follows from a constructive interpretation of the redemp-
tion premium on discounted preferred stock which is composed of
three components. First, the premium is deemed to be a theoretical
distribution of an additional amount of preferred stock as determined
by an annual, pro rata formula. In the second component of the anal-
ysis the distribution of stock is equated with the distribution of a cash
dividend. Thirdly, this theoretical cash dividend is constructively used
by the shareholder to purchase the additional preferred stock which the
redemption premium is said to represent. At several points in the fol-
lowing discussion this Treasury analysis will be compared against busi-
ness realities surrounding specific forms of discounted preferred stock.17
II. Mergers and Acquisitions
The policy favoring taxation of any dividend or corporate distri-
bution as ordinary income has long been relaxed when dealing with
mergers and acquisitions: All noncash property received in such a
reorganization is received either tax-free' or as capital gain.' 9 How-
A Useful Tax Planning Tool, 4 J. TAX. 312 (1956). While the Treasury once allowed this
device to pass muster under § 305(b), it now attacks the dividend on Class A stock as a
disproportionate dividend. Constructively, Class A stockholders received a taxable cash
dividend, which is then reinvested in additional stock. Lowrimore, I.R.S. Attempts to
Stop 2-Classes-of-Common-Tax-Saving Plan, 5 J. TAX. 178 (1956); Rev. Rul. 65-256, 1965-2
Cum. BULL. 85.
17. The new § 305 provisions suggest that there is a buttressing of the preferred stock
bail-out rules of § 306, rules which may lead to ordinary income recognition on dividends
on preferred stock. See note 97 infra. This represents a new policy direction for § 305.
Examples (5) and (7), Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), apply distribution of property tax
rules on deemed distributions of preferred (the result of §§ 306(a)(1)(A), 306(a)(2)) where
there is evidence that management is self-serving. In example (5) a corporation issues
preferred stock for S100 which in five years is redeemable for $185, representing a simple
rate of return of 17 percent annually. Example (7) describes a preferred stock issued on
common which pays a two percent rate of interest on a par value of $100, and is re-
deemable in five years for $105. The example stipulates that the initial fair market value
is ;50. With the constructive redemption premium added to the two percent interest,
this preferred issue returns 26 percent annually on the initial market value. Such high
rates of return lead to the inference that only a self-serving management would author-
ize the issuance of preferred on such terms, for the purpose of bailing out earned sur-
plus, which, of course, is precisely the concern underlying § 306.
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 354, provides generally that stock or securities received
from one party to a reorganization, and exchanged for the stock or securities of a
second party to the reorganization, are received tax-free.
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(9), acknowledges that capital gain arises from a
sale or exchange, where the asset sold or exchanged is a capital asset.
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ever, given the anticonglomerate fever of the times during which
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was incubated, it is almost certain that
Congress intended to reach discounted preferred stock issued during a
reorganization with the new deemed dividend rules.20 Perhaps Con-
gress wished to effect a result similar to that achieved under § 483
of the Code, which taxes as interest a portion of the sales price of
property for which payment is delayed.
Surprisingly the new § 305 regulations do not deal explicitly with
discounted preferred stock which is received in an exchange pur-
suant to corporate reorganization. As mentioned above, it appears
that the Treasury responded rather woodenly to the one guiding
example of the taxation of discounted preferred given by Congress.
No amplification was offered to clarify problems associated with cor-
porate consolidation. Nonetheless, it would appear that application
of new § 305 ,regulations will effect a segregation of purchase or
exchange price from dividend income.
21
To achieve this segregation in the context of a merger or acquisition,
the premium paid upon redemption of discounted preferred stock
will be analyzed by the Treasury in two steps. First, the preferred
stock which the departing shareholder receives will be valued at the
time of the merger or acquisition, and tax-free status will be accorded,
or capital gain to the extent of that value will be assessed. In the
second step of the Treasury's probable analysis, any subsequent re-
demption premium will be isolated and dealt with under the current
regulations, resulting, of course, in annual increments of ordinary
income.
22
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c) (1973) discusses taxing a premium given in recapitalization
to discharge dividend arrearages; this discussion may be taken to mean that § 305 is
directed at all reorganizations. On the other hand, this could be a special exception to a
rule that ordinarily § 305 is called off during reorganization. Indeed, the general silence
of § 305 on the subject may have been born out of massive importation of § 1232 con-
cepts. Curiously, Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c) (1973) states that as an alternative to the
procedure discussed at note 40 infra, if the gross amount of arrearages is less than the
difference between exchange values, it may be used as the ordinary income figure. The
excess of imputed issue price over exchange value plus dividend arrearages in that situa-
tion is not dealt with.
21. The language of Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), example (6), suggests this result.
That example gives the rule that in a reorganization (including mergers and acquisitions)
the exchange of preferred stock will be tax-free for the purposes of § 305 if exchanged
"for a new preferred stock having substantially the same market value and having no
greater call premium or liquidation preference...." The negative inference made by this
example is that an exchange of preferred stock under other than the stated conditions
would not be tax-free, i.e., any increment in value would be treated as "boot" which is
taxable at current income rates under § 356 of the Code. It should be noted that ex-
ample (6) implies that where the original security is a pre-1969 issue to which the tax
reforms do not apply, this exempt status will carry over to a new security which bears
substantially the same terms.
22. It is easy to construct a scenario in which the rules implied from Treas. Reg. §
1.305-5(d) (1973), example (6), produce inequitable results. For example, Corporation B
could wish to acquire Corporation A by means of a § 368(a)(1)(B) (stock for stock) ac-
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In the context of corporate acquisitions, the new preferred stock
rules seem to be directed against acquisitions which are financed
out of the retained or future earnings of the acquired corporation,
commonly called "bootstrap acquisitions." Following an unsuccessful
judicial attack,2 3 the Treasury dealt directly with this form of fi-
nancing when writing the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The overt pro-
visions focus on debt-related means of achieving bootstrap financing,
24
with § 305 and the regulations under that section blocking a back-
door access to similar tax advantage by means of equity-financed boot-
strap acquisitions.
Under the pre-1969 regulations, a corporate acquisition could have
been financed with a relative tax advantage to stockholders by the
use of discounted preferred stock. Departing shareholders2 5 in a
§ 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization would exchange their equity interest
in the acquired corporation for preferred stock with a redemption
premium.2 6 Their equity interest in the corporation would thus
be limited in duration to the term of the discounted preferred stock-
in instances where the issuer actually redeemed the preferred-and
the premium upon redemption would be taxed as capital gain. Al-
though affected by liquidation preference, the financial conditions
of the buying and acquired companies, and the terms of the redemp-
tion agreement, payment of the premium has always ultimately de-
pended on the future profitability of the acquired company. Under
both pre-1969 and current regulations, acquisitions achieved with
the use of discounted preferred stock do not entail the overwhelming
tax advantage to the corporation that was present in the landmark boot-
quisition, offering B's common at a substantial premium. To acquire a convertible pre-
ferred issuance of Corporation A (the conversion feature of which would create a sub-
stantial increment in value as compared to previous market value, because of the pre-
mium offered for A stock) B may wish to offer a nonconvertible preferred stock, issued
at parity with the previous market value of the A preferred, but bearing a substantial
redemption premium to offset the value of the conversion feature. While the redemption
premium of the B preferred clearly represents the purchase of an equity interest of A
preferred shareholders, the new rules mandate ordinary income treatment of the dis-
count on redemption price.
23. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (Brown sold his business to a chari-
table organization which liquidated the corporation, leased the assets back to a second
Brown enterprise, and relied on rentals from the lease to pay Brown the purchase price;
held, that the disposition of Brown's first business was a valid sale resulting in capital
gains).
24. The Act added INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 514, which taxes charities on business
income to the extent that earnings are financed with the use of borrowed funds. See
,generally Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Bootstrap Stock Acquisitions: The Redemption
Route vs. The Dividend Route, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1459 (1974).
25. Shareholders are departing in the sense that their equity interest is limited in
duration to the preredemption period on the discounted preferred stock.
26. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c), CCH 1974 STAND. FED. TAx REP. qJ 8832A, 37
Fed. Reg. 7163 (1972), promises to reduce the importance of preferred stock in B re-
organizations. That regulation will require that only voting stock be exchanged for
voting stock if the reorganization is to be tax-free.
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strap acquisition decision of Commissioner v. Brown.27 Where dis-
counted preferred stock is used, the corporation makes one nonde-
ductible dividend payment at the end of the period, when it re-
deems, rather than interest payments deductible each year.28 How-
ever, under pre-1969 rules there would still be an advantage for
shareholders because the redemption premium of the equity-financed
acquisition would be treated as capital gain. By the imposition of
dividend treatment, the new regulations analogize the premium to
interest, bringing the entire differential between redemption value
and imputed issue price following reorganization into ordinary income.
Application of this constructive dividend rule to acquisitions and
mergers is inappropriate. The Treasury itself has drawn a distinction
between bootstrap financing and the payment of a contingent price
adjustment in a merger or acquisition. Contingent price adjustments
tie further increases (or, less commonly, reductions) in purchase price
to the occurrence of a future event, such as success in litigation or
the grant of a patent.29 When the Treasury allows such payments
without tax liability"0 but taxes the redemption premium on dis-
counted preferred, it relies on a distinction which cannot be main-
tained. The theoretical distinction, of course, between a redemption
premium on preferred stock offered pursuant to a merger or acquisition
and a contingent sales price adjustment is that the redemption premium
is automatic while a contingent payout depends on the uncertain
course of the acquired corporation. But in reality whether redemption
is automatic depends on the terms of the issuance. And some contin-
gent payouts are in fact highly certain; they may simply be couched
in terms of a contingency that is almost sure to occur.
The contingency is in theory indicative of a dispute about the
27. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
28. See note 35 infra; cf. note 72 infra.
29. See Rev. Rul. 67-90, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 79; Rev. Rul. 66-112, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 68.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-1(c) (1973) exempts from deemed dividend treatment "an in-
crease or decrease in the conversion ratio or redemption price of stock which represents
an adjustment of the price to be paid by the distributing corporation in acquiring prop-
erty (within the meaning of section 317(a))." The one example given to describe this
Regulation defines "adjustment" very narrowly and conventionally. In this example the
conversion ratio of convertible preferred is to be increased at a later date, contingent
upon the performance of the acquired corporation during the first six years of the
merger. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-1(c) (1973) defines "adjustment" as a future change in re-
demption premium or conversion ratio which is based on a contingency that is not pre-
dictable at the time of the reorganization. Eustice, commenting before the regulations
under § 305 were adopted, pointed out that even the "if-come" provision, which bases
additional distributions on a contingency, would be taxable under a liberal reading of §
305(b)(2) since the equity interests of those benefitting from the adjustment would be
increased disproportionately vis-,-vis other shareholders. Eustice, supra note 15, at 545.
The Treasury has not employed such a reading, however.
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value of the acquired company,31 but this hardly gives rise to a valid
distinction from discounted preferred. With both a redemption pre-
mium and a contingent sales price adjustment it is likely that the
departing shareholders or property owners are gambling on prospects
of future profitability, either that of the acquired corporation in the
case of the contingent interest, or that of the combined enterprise
in the case of the preferred stock issued during reorganization. Both
the contingent interest and the redemption premium may in fact
have indeterminate present value, and in both instances there is a
substantial (but unrecognized) possibility that the acquired com-
pany's owners are self-financing the acquisition by accepting a future
promise of payment which amounts to an equity interest and which
entails a degree of risk that is ordinarily associated with equity
ownership. In a transaction which involves substantial investment risk,
a rule which precludes the possibility of capital gains taxation is not
wholly appropriate.
One might still argue that taxation as ordinary income is proper
on the ground that the shareholder receiving discounted preferred
stock thereby increases his proportionate interest in the enterprise. But
such an approach conflicts with the usual principles underlying taxa-
tion in situations of merger and acquisition. In either the case of
a contingent price adjustment or a redemption premium the pro-
portionate interest test should be irrelevant. Mergers and acquisi-
tions necessarily adjust the absolute equity interests of shareholders
of both the acquired and the acquiring companies.3 2 It has always
been assumed that adjustments made by mergers and acquisitions
are entitled to capital gains treatment or deferral of tax as long as
the adjustment conforms to the continuity of interest test.33
31. See Libin & Moorehead, Stock Dividend Benefits Restricted but not Eliminated by
the New Tax Law, 32 J. TAX. 258 (1970) (simple exchange of common for preferred in a
recapitalization has similar effect of increasing the equity interest of subsequent common
shareholders). See generally Murphy, Contingent Share Reorganizations, U. So. CAL. 1969
TAX INST. 255; Tillinghast, Contingent Stock Pay-Outs in Tax-Free Reorganizations, 22
TAX LAW. 467 (1969).
32. See Courtland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (Augustus N. Hand, J., for the court: "Reorganization,
merger, and consolidation are words indicating corporate readjustments of existing
interests. They all differ fundamentally from a sale where the vendor corporation parts
with its interest for cash and receives nothing more"). Despite the limited scope of Treas.
Reg. § 1.305-1(c) (1973), it does recognize the principle that upon reorganization, pro-
portionate stock interests may be altered as between shareholders of the acquiring cor-
poration and those who hold stock in the surviving corporation as a result of a tender
offer.
53. This doctrine provides that when a shareholder's basic investment interest con-
tinues after a reorganization, tax liability is deferred. See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 Us.
415 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). See generally B. BrrKERa & J. EusricE,
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Corporations have a theoretical alternative to self-financed acqui-
sitions, but the alternative only serves to highlight the problems
with the § 305 regulations. The acquiring company could negotiate
a loan with an outside lender and buy out the departing shareholders'
interests immediately. In this alternative situation the money that the
departing shareholders receive would clearly be taxed as the sale of a
capital asset rather than as a dividend distribution. 34 There is no
tax policy reason for treating the loan situation more advantageously
than the self-financing situation.35 Indeed, the distinction between
the two types of financing potentially discriminates against mergers of
those companies, usually small ones, which must necessarily rely on
self-financing due to the unavailability of institutional financing.3°,
Although Congress revised § 305 of the Code to curtail economically
unsound conglomerate mergers, the current § 305 provisions are
themselves economically irrational; they place undue restrictions on
consolidation, restrictions which are not based on any notion of ef-
ficiency. Additionally, they are more likely to hamper small mergers
than to affect the large conglomerates-the apparent targets of the
1969 Tax Reform Act.
III. Technical Problems and the § 1232 Analogy
A. Issue Price
The merger and acquisition context suggests certain technical
problems in the application of the § 305 regulations. For example,
one of the most significant shortcomings of the § 305 regulations is
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14-1 to -152 (3d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as BITiXER & EUSTICE]; Dane, The Case for Nonrecognition in Re-
organization Exchanges, 36 TAXES 244 (1958) (defending the Code's rationale); Heller-
stein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARv. L. REv. 254 (1957) (questioning the basic
policy). For a concise overview of tax-free mergers, see Sinrich, Tax Incentives and the
Conglomerate Merger, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQuISITIONs, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1009 (spec. ed. 1970).
34. An immediate distribution of capital would constitute a stock sale, of course,
causing departing shareholders to incur immediate capital gains. See Sinrich, supra note
33, at 1010.
35. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163, the primary relative advantage of institu-
tional financing vis-h-vis shareholder financing through discounted preferred is that the
interest paid to an institutional lender is deductible, whereas payments to preferred
stockholders are not deductible. In addition, the taxation of the redemption premium
at ordinary income rates, which the new regulations require, removes in part the
former advantage of permitting a delayed capital gain to shareholders who self-finance.
36. Small companies which would be likely to use seller financing of acquisitions are
not considered to be harmful to the competitive climate of the economy. See Brown
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). In discussion of exceptions to the
1950 Amendments of § 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court noted that Congress did not
wish to "impede, for example, a merger between two small companies to enable the
combination to compete more effectively with larger corporations...." Indeed, such
combinations might result in "stimulation to competition." Id. at 319.
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their failure explicitly to define "issue price." Issue price is a critical
concept because it segregates the equity and dividend elements of
discounted preferred by establishing the extent of the discount which
will be taken into ordinary income. Yet the method of determining
issue price may only be inferred from an opaque reference in two
examples in the regulations. They suggest that issue price will be
equated with either the price paid for a new preferred stock issue,
or with the fair market value of preferred immediately after issuance.
However, the examples give no means for choosing between the two
standards.37 These standards may be workable for a simple public
issue of discounted preferred, but they produce confusion in compli-
cated transactions such as those associated with reorganizations, or
in closely held issuances where the market is not a factor.
As an example of this unworkability, consider a § 368(a)(1)(B) ac-
quisition of Corporation A by Corporation B, where A has outstanding
a convertible preferred issue, sold to the public a year earlier at $80,
currently trading at $85. In exchange, B offers a convertible pre-
ferred with a liquidation value of $90, redeemable in 5 years for
,110. Exchange takes effect on a Friday, and due to a political set-
back of B's international aspirations over the weekend, the market
discounts conversion rights and likelihood of redemption, valuing the
B preferred at $50 on Monday's opening. Should the issue price of B's
preferred be set at $90, its stated value on Friday; at $50 (producing
a 512 constructive annual dividend over the next 5 years), the market
value on Monday; at $85, the value of what was "paid" for the stock
in the form of exchange; or $80, the cash originally paid out for the
A preferred?
The implied rule that issue price equals fair market value of
discounted preferred immediately after reorganization is inadequate.
It presumes that there will be an active market for such stock, and
that the market will react only to future rates of return. Quite pos-
sibly a small group of shareholders will receive the entire issuance,
rendering useless any open market standard. If redemption is not
mandatory, participation in future income of the consolidated cor-
poration, as represented by the discount, may be so speculative that
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), examples (5), (7). Example (5) discusses a pre-
ferred stock issue which is apparently, but not clearly, offered to the public. Example
(7) describes a hypothetical preferred with a stipulated "fair market value." While there
is no discussion of how this value is ascertained, one must assume that general fair
market value principles will take effect. Since the contemplated rate of return on the
stock in both examples is very high, both of these examples suggest self-dealing by
management which would make a fair market value meaningless or unascertainable.
These examples are limited by their facts-it is difficult to argue that they state a solid,
broadly applicable rule.
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the market gives it minimal value. 8 In addition, the immediate fair
market value will reflect the market's expectation about the newly
organized enterprise: where such expectation is unfavorable, the re-
demption premium will be overstated, to the extent which the market
undervalues the stock. Conversely, the redemption premium will be
understated when market expectations are favorable.
Similarly, it is unsound to set issue price equal to the price paid
for the discounted preferred issued in a reorganization. By equating
issue price with the value of the stock surrendered, any sweetener
or market reaction will also distort the results.
Another provision of the regulations might suggest a means for
determining issue price. In the limited instance of a recapitalization
in discharge of dividend arrearages, 39 the regulations give the faintest
hint that the issue price of preferred stock given in a reorganization
may be determined by its par value as represented by the stated liq-
uidation preference. 40 The hint is tempting, but the temptation
should be resisted. In a merger or acquisition an increase in par value
has a greater identity with equity than such an increase given to
discharge dividend arrearages. This is so because the additional face
value of the stock is less likely to be a substitute for dividends and
more likely to represent a sweetener added to the acquisition price or
an offset for the departing shareholder's increase in investment risk.
Additionally, there is no rule which prevents the typical practice of
assigning meaninglessly low par values, or freely varying liquidation
rights.
The regulations for § 305 thus give rise to important problems of
interpretation. It seems promising to try to cure them by reference or
analogy to § 1232 of the Code, a much more detailed provision than
the § 305 regulations. After all, by treating the redemption premium
as a constructive dividend rather than as a payment of the purchase
price, the Treasury is imposing recognition rules on preferred stock
which substantially resemble the treatment of original issue discount
38. To tax appreciation on such a speculative position offends the usual concept that
risk implies equity, and equity implies capital gain.
39. When dividends are omitted, cumulative preferred stock accumulates the ar-
rearages as a liability against the corporation which must be repaid, terms of repayment
depending on contract. Often in a recapitalization such arrearages are eliminated by ex-
changing the old preferred for a greater amount of new preferred.
40. In a § 368(a)(1)(E) recapitalization, the increase in proportionate interest attrib-
utable to dividend arrearages is to be determined by the difference between the issue
price of the preferred stock surrendered and the fair market value, or the liquidation
preference of the stock received, whichever is greater. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c) (1973).
While this is a circular definition of issue price, liquidation preference is given as an
alternative to fair market value.
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debt under § 1232 of the Code. And, as Professors Bittker and Eustice
note in their treatise, "[p]referred stock 'retirement premiums' bear a
close functional relation to the debt issue discount rules of § 1232(a)(3)
... and [the relevant provisions of § 305] can be viewed as a backstop
to protect avoidance of these provisions."''4
Section 1232 defines issue price with great precision. When a dis-
counted bond is offered to the public, the initial offering price is
equated with the issue price. In the case of privately placed debt
securities, the price paid by the first buyer is taken as the issue
price. And, when an original issue discount bond is exchanged
for stock or other securities which are traded on an established se-
curities market (other than an exchange pursuant to § 368(a)(1)) the
fair market value of the property exchanged determines the issue
price.42 Curiously enough, when the bond is exchanged for stock
during a corporate reorganization, issue price is equated with stated
redemption price at maturity,43 which results in a reinstatement of
former original issue discount rules.44 That is, taxation is deferred
on the entire premium until it is actually received upon redemption
or disposition.
B. Transition Problems
Transition to current § 305 rules presents a second technical prob-
lem inadequately treated by the regulations. Under the liberal tran-
sition rules of amended § 305, 45 it is probable that some issuances of
discounted preferred stock will escape deemed distribution treatment.
The regulations, however, give no guidance on the treatment of pre-
1969 discounted preferred stock exchanged for new discounted pre-
41. BITrKER 9- EusTIcE, supra note 33, at 7-77 n.132. A word of caution about anal-
ogizing discounted preferred to original issue discount indebtedness: While there is
a great deal of similarity between the two forms of securities and between the regula-
tions dealing with each of them, neither the regulations nor the Code itself cross ref-
erence § 305 to § 1232. Hence, any comparison is merely suggestive.
42. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(b)(2).
43. Although both the original House and Senate versions of the Tax Reform Act of
1969 included debt issued pursuant to a tax-free reorganization within the coverage of
amended § 1232, such coverage was deleted by the Senate during floor debate. See
BIrrKER & EUSTiCE, supra note 33, at 4-58. Anomalously, therefore, a very potent anti-
conglomerate debt provision was lost, while § 305(b)(4) and related regulations, its equity
counterpart, are preserved. The regulations therefore have explicitly exempted from
new original issue discount accrual rules all discounted debt received in a corporate
reorganization unless it is received in exchange for discounted debt which already falls
under the new tax schema. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1232-3(b)(l)(iv) (1972); 1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii)(d)
(1972). It is likely that old case law will attach, stipulating that upon disposition the
difference between basis and disposition price will result in ordinary income, i.e., gain
from the sale of noncapital property. See, e.g., United States v. Midland Ross Corp., 381
U.S. 54 (1965).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-8 (1973).
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ferred after 1969.46 Section 1232 provides that discounted debt whose
basis carries over to pre-1969 original issue discount securities will be
afforded the more favorable tax status of the exchanged debt issue.
Regulations under § 1232 further provide that basis and discount
characteristics of these debt securities are not disturbed when the
securities are acquired from a decedent.
47
C. Pre-Maturity Dispositions and Other Problems in
Computing the Premium
Probably the most difficult tax problems which practitioners will
confront with the new discounted preferred regulations involve pre-
maturity dispositions48-problems such as allocating cost basis or al-
locating constructive income. Here importing the technical detail
of § 1232 can be of real help. The market value of discounted pre-
ferred will often increase disproportionately so tfiat in many cases the
actual redemption premium which the pre-maturity buyer receives
will be less than the pro rata amount of premium which the original
holder of the discounted preferred stock had not yet accrued as
ordinary income. In such a case, § 1232 provides that the purchaser
must pay ordinary income tax only on ratable portions of the dis-
count actually received.49 On the seller's side, § 1232 provides a pre-
cise formula to determine the amount of constructive interest in a
pre-maturity sale of discounted indebtedness.50 Section 1232 also con-
tains complicated provisions governing the extent to which an original
issue discount holder may realize capital gain upon sale or exchange.r1
These § 1232 provisions will be useful for simple transactions that
fall within § 305. But discounted preferred stock does not inevitably
46. Given the silence of the regulations, it is certainly quite possible that the courts
would give the phrase "issued after January 10, 1969" a broad meaning, extending the
new regulations without exception to any preferred stock issued after that date.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a)(3)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b) (2)(iii) (1972). By
implication, Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), example (6), provides carryover treatment.
See note 21 supra.
48. All nine examples of discounted preferred stock which appear in the regulations
are based on the assumption that the initial holder will be the holder at maturity.
49. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1232(a)(3)(B).
50. Id. § 1232(a) (3)(A) provides that for determining the ratable portion to be taken
into income, a monthly basis of calculation shall be used. The monthly periods are
established by the date of issuance of discount indebtedness to the original holder. If a
discount bond is acquired in any way other than original issuance, such as by pur-
chase on the market, provision is made for allocation of a fractional monthly portion
of the pro rata annual amount between buyer and seller.
51. Id. § 1232(a)(2) provides that gain derived from the sale of a bond held for a
period greater than six mohths, unless there can be shown an intention on the part
of the issuer to redeem before maturity, is capital gain. Any portion of the selling price
which has already been included in income shall not be subject to double taxation as a
subsequent capital gain. (Such a provision is notably lacking under § 305.) Additionally,
any purchase price premium may be amortized and is not subject to gains treatment.
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mature the way bonds do. In fact, discounted preferred stock issues
commonly provide for gradual partial redemption of the stock over
long periods of time. Such a feature will raise questions about al-
locating basis and determining the discount.52 The original issue dis-
count debt regulations provide some assistance by allowing for ad-
justment of the debt issue's basis in partial redemption,. 3 but they do
not solve all of the problems.
52. This problem and others are demonstrated by AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORP., PRE-
LIMINARY PROSPECTUS (May 11, 1973), which sets forth the terms upon which American
Financial Corporation agreed to redeem discounted preferred stock which was offered in
exchange for shares of National General Corporation. The prospectus states:
AFC will be obligated to retire, at S14.5 per share plus accrued dividends, 10% of
the number of preferred shares originally issued ... in each of the years 1983 to
1992 inclusive, subject to credits at AFC's option for the number of shares pur-
chased or redeemed, otherwise than pursuant to this requirement. In addition, AFC
at its option may retire, at the same price, up to an additional 10% of the shares in
each of the years 1983 to 1992, exclusive, such option right of redemption being
cumulative.
Id. at 12. The prospectus goes on to provide that the preferred is callable at the option
of the issuer in 1978 at $15.88 per share, and is callable any year thereafter at a price
which decreases 10 cents per year.
The American Financial Corporation offer illustrates as well the difficulties of com-
putation when only a portion of the outstanding shares will be redeemed in a given
year. In such cases it would be inaccurate to calculate pro rata amounts of redemption
simply by dividing the total redemption premium by the total number of years until
complete maturity. An exaggerated example illustrates this observation. Suppose a com-
pany issues X shares of preferred for $100, promising to redeem half for $100 in 10
years, the other half for the same amount in 20 years. Thus there is a total premium of
5100 which, divided by 20 years (the amount of time until all stock is redeemed) results
in a pro rata yearly figure of $5. But it would seem more logical to say that $50 of the
total $I00 premium was received during the first 10 years ($5 per year for years one
through 10) while the remaining S50 of the premium was received over 20 years. Thus,
a total of $7.50 is distributed to the shareholders for the first 10 years, and only $2.50
per year is distributed during the last 10 years. To the extent that the current regula-
tions implement a crude calculation of the average yearly distributions, resulting above
in the S5 figure, there is delayed tax liability. The result is the same, with more com-
plicated computational problems, in the American Financial situation where redemption
is spread out over 10 years.
There is thus great uncertainty about the exact terms under which redemption will
actually take place, given the number of options open to the issuer. It is not clear
which of the options will be used by the Treasury in determining the amount of redemp-
tion price which is to be the basis for establishing a premium. Nor is it clear how long
the Treasury will calculate the preredemption period to be.
The examples in the regulations contemplate only a very simple redemption plan and
do not reach these complex issues. The congressional committees gave the example of
preferred stock issued for $100, redeemable in full in 20 years for $200, and paying no
dividend in the meantime. The annual deemed distribution was obtained by dividing
the total premium of $100 by 20 years, giving a distribution of $5 per year. See note 10
supra. The distribution in the example given by Congress is computed on the basis of
simple as opposed to compound interest rates. In the case of a long preredemption period,
the difference between simple and compounded rates of interest could be substantial.
Thus the regulations embody an added disincentive to the use of discounted preferred,
because income devices which allow compounding of interest would be relatively more
attractive to the investor. In the example given by the congressional committees, the
rate of imputed income at which the issue is being taxed exceeds the actual rate of
return.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3A(e)(2)(iii) (1972) stipulates that if a portion of an obliga-
tion (other than a single obligation having serial maturity dates) is redeemed prior to
the stated maturity date of the entire obligation, the adjusted basis of the remaining
portion shall be equal to the adjusted basis of the entire obligation minus the amount
paid upon the partial redemption.
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Debt issues bear a definite maturity date, but this is not necessarily
true of redeemable discounted preferred stock. Thus, it is unclear
how the regulations will be applied to discounted preferred which
increases in redemption price but does not evidence a fixed corporate
obligation to redeem.54 The problem of discounted preferred stock
with a nonmandatory redemption agreement reflects perhaps the most
substantial warp in the thinking which underlies new preferred stock
rules. Where redemption is exercised at the discretion of the cor-
porate issuer, there is little justification for taxing the preferred stock-
holder on "dividend income" which he never has power to demand
and may never receive. The problem is less severe in the case of a
close corporation whose discounted preferred shareholders may have
considerable influence over the corporation's decision to redeem.
On the face of the regulations, however, it seems inevitable that all
preferred shareholders will be confronted with annual accrued tax
liability.
A similar problem is presented by the preferred issue which has
a sliding-scale redemption provision. For the first several years the
redemption value of such an issue may increase after which it de-
creases. If the § 305 rules are to be applied consistently, the increas-
ing redemption premium will be treated as a constructive dividend.
The declining redemption value will thus create an anomalous de-
duction offsetting income. In this situation, as in the instance of
nonmandatory redemption, a possible solution would be to consider
the transaction open-ended, delaying recognition until the actual out-
come of the redemption feature can be determined. 0 More standard
forms of preferred stock, such as cumulative issues which add unpaid
dividends to the redemption price00 or those which permit early re-
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), example (5), discussed in note 37 supra, describes
a preferred issue which contains a term stipulating that during the unlimited number
of years before the preferred stock is redeemed, the redemption price shall increase by a
given amount.
55. See Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). This is a result which for reasons of
loss of revenue the Treasury is understandably hesitant to permit.
56. One frequently encountered term of a discounted preferred issue involves the
provision for redemption at par plus accumulated but unpaid dividends. This apparent
increase in the redemption value, which is analogous to a discount, is given incomplete
attention by the regulations, which provide only for discharge of dividend arrearages
upon recapitalization. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c) (1973). Here again, the most reason-
able resolution seems to be open-ended characterization of the redemption feature. See
Committee on Corporate Taxation of the N.Y. Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Comments on
Proposed Regulations under Section 305 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 49 TAxs
460, 487 (1971).
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demption at the option of the issuer 57 create similar problems of in-
determinate tax status which cannot be solved by reference to § 1232.
D. Adjustments to Basis
In the case of original issue discount indebtedness, both Code and
regulations state a simple, precise formula for increasing the debt-
holder's cost basis. The basis is adjusted upward annually as interest
-a pro rata portion of the discount-is constructively taken into
income, This is necessary to prevent double taxation of the dis-
count, once as income and again as capital gain upon redemption.
Similarly, a discounted equity instrument requires provisions which
prevent double taxation. Section 305 and attending regulations, how-
ever, do not make adequate provision for the adjustment of cost
basis of discounted preferred.
The basis provisions under § 301 govern § 305 basis questions be-
cause a disproportionate constructive stock dividend is defined as a
§ 301 distribution. Section 301, however, produces a complicated re-
sult that differs markedly from the straightforward adjustment on
the § 1232 model which one would expect.
Section 301(d)(1) of the Code gives the fundamental rule that
"the basis of property received in a distribution to which subsection
(a) applies shall be ... the fair market value of such property." 9
If applied by its terms, § 301 will require a determination of the
fair market value of a highly elusive entity; the market value of each
57. Redemption premiums may be conceived which permit early redemption at the
option of the issuer. This situation will raise a question of interpretation when redemp-
tion is made prior to the time when the premium has been taken entirely into income.
Would the redemption premium be capital gain or ordinary income to the holder? Since
the regulations provide no rules regarding cost basis adjustment in such a situation,
premature payment of the redemption premium could give rise to capital gain, to the
extent that the redemption price exceeds the adjusted basis as determined by § 301.
However, in the discussion of acceptable redemption premiums for premature redemp-
tion, the regulations seem to be saying that no more than a 10 percent premium will be
accorded capital gains treatment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b)(2) (1973). Probably any
premium in excess of 10 percent will be taken to be a deemed disproportionate distribu-
tion, resulting in dividend income. This may annoy one's sense of order in that a cost basis
adjustment under § 301 must be made in improper sequence, i.e., after the stock has
been disposed of.
58. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 1232(a)(3)(D); Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3A(c) (1972).
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(b) (1955) goes on to add that if the distribution is not made
in cash, fair market value is determined as of the date of distribution. Regulations under
§ 305 seem to endorse the fair market value approach of § 301. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §
1.305-5(d) (1973), examples (1), (7). However, Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), example (5),
introduces confusion; in that example the value of the redemption premium is deter-
mined by redemption price rather than by fair market value. It should be noted that the
text discusses the typical case of basis adjustment for individual shareholders. However,
differing basis results for corporate distributees are given in INT. REV. CODE or 1954, §§
301(d)(2)-(4).
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deemed distribution on the discounted preferred will have to be
evaluated at the time it is constructively received by the taxpayer.
The value of the deemed distribution will probably be ascertained
by considering the fair market value of the taxpayer's total holdings
of discounted preferred at the time when the Treasury deems that
a distribution takes place. In the instance of a preferred issue with
a long preredemption period and nonmandatory redemption, the
market will probably discount the likelihood that the stock will be
redeemed. In the early years the fair market value of stock con-
structively received may be less than the pro rata amount of the re-
demption premium. Certainly, the market price of the preferred
will vary with market conditions such as the prevailing interest rate.
A convertible preferred issue may also fluctuate as the common stock
of the corporation fluctuates. Where there is a substantial increase
in market value, strict adherence to § 301 basis rules indicates an
expansion of cost basis which is disproportionate to constructive
dividend income. Conversely, where the preferred stock's market
value declines, the basis will be increased by less than deemed dividend
income.
Regulations under § 305 state no explicit rule about the determina-
tion of the amount which is subject to potential dividend treatment.
However, the examples given lead to the inescapable conclusion that
equal pro rata amounts of the redemption premium value will be
taken into income annually, rather than any amount determined by
fair market value.0° Thus the cost basis of each share of discounted
preferred will be adjusted, but the adjustment will bear only a hap-
hazard relation to the amount of constructive ordinary income on
which the recipient pays taxes annually. Section 1232 obviously pro-
vides a far more logical treatment-basis adjustments should be ex-
actly equal to deemed dividends-but neither Code nor regulations
presently assure this result. The graft of debt rules onto an equity
transaction in § 305 thus results in an oversimplified assessment of
the value of the deemed distribution.
Section 301 contains other distinctive provisions which yield curious
results when applied to discounted preferred, 61 even though they
60. The examples given in Treas. Reg. J 1.305-5(d) (1973) all discuss the constructive
dividend, when applicable, in terms of a pro rata portion of the premium rather than
in terms of the fair market value of the deemed distribution.
61. See H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 113, which in casual discussion confines its at-
tention to "dividends" on preferred. The report states that the Ways and Means Com-
mittee "believes that dividends paid on preferred stock should be taxed whether they are
received in cash or in another form, such as... rights to receive an increased amount on
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may make sense for less exotic forms of disproportionate (hence cur-
rently taxed) stock dividends. In contrast to § 1232 which taxes pro
rata annual interest on discounted debt regardless of the financial
status of the issuer, deemed § 301 equity distributions may give rise
to no current taxation, and may indeed reduce cost basis. As stipulated
by §§ 301 and 316, where a corporation has no current or retained
earnings, a distribution to the stockholders is applied as a reduction
of basis, any excess over basis being taken as capital gain. Therefore
under present rules deemed § 301 distributions on preferred may lead
to widely disparate results. The stockholder could in a given year
experience upward or downward basis adjustment. The deemed dis-
tribution could be taken as dividend income or, where the issuer
has no earned surplus and basis is reduced to zero, the deemed dis-
tribution might even give rise to a capital gain. Moreover, where the
corporation is not required under the agreement to redeem the stock,
it is not inconceivable that § 305 might force a shareholder to accrue
income which will never be realized as a cash redemption.
One possible path out of the forest would be adoption of a per
se rule under § 301 or § 305 which equates basis increments on dis-
counted preferred with pro rata yearly distributions of the redemption
premium. Such a rule, however, would still not restore justice in
situations where the value of the preferred stock declines substantially,
thus making ultimate redemption highly unlikely. When a discounted
preferred issue suffers severe reduction in value, the pro rata con-
structive dividend rule of § 305 as it is now constituted may force a
shareholder to realize dividend income 62 even though the preferred
stock promises to be ultimately unprofitable . 3 An increase in the
eventual capital loss, which would be the result of a per se basis ad-
redemption." However, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c)(1), provides that "that portion of
the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in section 316) shall be included in gross
income." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a), defines a "dividend" as any distribution of
property which is made out of current earnings or earnings and profits accumulated after
February 28, 1913. Section 301(c)(2) goes on to provide that additional amounts of dis-
tribution shall be applied against basis in the stock, and amounts in excess of basis shall
be treated as capital gain.
62. Realization depends, of course, on whether the corporation has current or re-
tained earnings at the time of the distribution, as stipulated by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 316.
63. For example, a corporation may be on the verge of bankruptcy, owing creditors
interest and impending maturity payments on bonds which have a higher priority than
preferred stock in the event of bankruptcy and liquidation. In such a case, the market
would assign only an extremely minimal value to the corporation's discounted preferred
stock. Nonetheless, the preferred stockholders, according to the inevitable rule of the
§ 305 regulations, realize income on the basis of previous issue values which bear no
relevance to the present.
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justment, would not offset the tax loss incurred because the share-
holder paid taxes on fictitious dividend income.6 4
Section 1232 provides an analogy useful for solving some of the
interpretive problems created by the simplicity of the regulations
under § 305, particularly when the discounted preferred issue involved
bears a great many functional similarities to original issue discount
indebtedness (e.g., when the preferred carries a mandatory redemption
date). But in a wide variety of situations, such as issuance during
an acquisitive reorganization, a substantial drop in market value, or
permissive redemption, a large number of problems remain.
IV. Obscuring the Distinctions Between Debt and Equity
The- failure of § 305 regulations to address the wide variety of
technical problems which arise under the new constructive dividend
scheme for discounted preferred stock demonstrates the folly of treat-
ing an equity interest, which preferred stock represents, as a debt
security. The less that discounted preferred stock resembles original
issue discount indebtedness, the greater the problems of interpre-
tation. Resolution of problems with discounted preferred depends
largely on sorting out this essential distinction between investment
instruments.
Debt is always limited in its term, and return on debt is generally
considered to be the payment of interest which must be taken into
ordinary income.6 5 An equity interest in a corporation, however, can-
not be viewed so simply. Payments on equity are not always payments
of dividends; they may reflect an increased value of the capital. Equity
is usually not limited in its term of existence, and equity does not
represent the relative security and priority of debt.66
64. To carry an absurdity to the extreme, one may even conceive of a stock with
negative value, should annual deemed dividend distributions exceed probable redemption
value.
65. However, § 1232 itself is ambiguous on this point. See BIrraKE & EUSTICE, supra
note 33, at 4-57: "One unfortunate shortcoming of the new issue discount provisions is
their failure once again to clarify the character of issue discount income." It is unclear
whether the new provisions treat the discount as interest per se, or merely ordinary gain.
By importing § 1232 rules into § 305, the Treasury also seems to have imported the am-
biguous tax status of the discount.
66. Such statements are generalizations. If risk were to be measured on an absolute
scale, certainly the common of some blue chip companies would offer greater investment
safety than the debt of less established firms. It should be hoped that the regulations
under § 385 will define risk in terms relative to the various securities offered by each
corporation, rather than on an absolute standard (such as a fixed debt to equity ratio).
If the standard is to be absolute, the freedom of less well-heeled companies to char-
acterize their own securities as they wish will be severely impaired.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended the tax liability of the
holder of original issue discount debt by causing the holder to take
into income annually a pro rata share of the original issue discount.
The decision to alter this treatment of the debtholder was based on
sound policy gTounds.07 The most fundamental objection made to
pre-1969 taxation of original issue discount indebtedness was that
the treatment of the debtholders did not parallel the tax deductions
taken by the issuer.6 Holders of discounted debt encountered lia-
bility for income tax only upon redemption or disposition of their
bonds,10 but issuers took annual interest deductions on a pro rata
share of the discount over the life of the debt. Original issue dis-
count debt was also open to tax fraud because holders of the security
did not always take the amount of the discount into income upon
redemption."0 And general anticonglomerate policy regarded the
deferral of income recognition as a tax advantage which encouraged
acquisitions.
1
By using the § 1232 analogy to define § 305 concepts, the Treasury
now imposes upon holders and issuers of discounted preferred the
same anomalous treatment that motivated reform of § 1232, but the
burdens are reversed. Holders of discounted preferred stock are taxed
like holders of debt because they constructively receive ordinary in-
come each year, but issuers of discounted preferred receive equity
tax treatment because they cannot take an annual deduction for
the deemed distributions.7 2 When redemption premiums on pre-
ferred were formerly allowed capital gains treatment, there simply
was no problem of nonparallel treatment as between issuer and dis-
counted preferred holder which suggested the presence of tax delay
or tax avoidance. The objection made to the accrual of the preferred
shareholder's tax liability which new § 305 rules impose is primarily
an objection to the timing of the tax payment. The greater investment
67. See Landis, Original Issue Discount After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 24 TAX
Lmv. 435, 441 (1971); H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 107-08.
68. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 109; S. REP., supra note 2, at 146-47.
69. In 1965 the Supreme Court established that disposition of discounted bonds gives
rise to ordinary income rather than capital gain to the extent of the discount. United
States v. Midland Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965).
70. Under the new law, issuers are now required to return an information form
(Form 1099) annually to both the debtholder and to the Government where the pro
rata amount of constructive interest exceeds $10. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6049(a).
71. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 103. Ironically, original issue discount used in a
corporate reorganization is sheltered from new § 1232 rules, as a result of last minute
changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See note 43 supra.
72. However, under Treas. Reg. § 1.312-1(d) (1955) corporations may reduce their
earned surplus account to the extent that shareholders must include deemed distribu-
tions in gross income.
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risk of preferred stock vis-A-vis debt is sufficient to raise the argument
that equityholders should not be taxed until cash is actually received.7 3
Moreover, as has been discussed, in the context of corporate mer-
gers and acquisitions distinctions which have important tax conse-
quences are seemingly ignored by the new discounted preferred regu-
lations.7 4 The Code draws a distinction between the receipt of cash
or cash equivalents on the one hand and of equity instruments or
most other securities on the other.7" When a departing shareholder
receives as part of an acquisition offer a promise of a deferred pay-
ment of purchase price which is in the form of a redemption premium,
the new regulations essentially regard the premium as a cash equiva-
lent. The regulations treat the premium as analogous to boot,"0 the
73. The question of how shareholders should be taxed upon receipt of the redemp-
tion premium is a difficult one. Cash basis principles of accounting require that at the
very least, ordinary income recognition should be delayed until redemption (partial
redemptions could be devised to lessen the sting of one huge addition to ordinary in-
come). Where the investment risk is substantial (e.g., where redemption is nonmanda-
tory), there would be a good argument that the return represented by the redemption
premium should be taxed as capital gain.
74. The distinction is in fact made for the sake of reorganizations generally. Thus it
is equally critical in recapitalizations and incorporations whether a debt or equity in-
strument is regarded as a cash equivalent.
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354(a)(1), 361(a)(1) grant tax-free status to the transfer
of securities or stock of one corporation for similar securities or stock of another, in-
cluding inter alia transfers made in mergers and acquisitions. Judicial interpretation and
the regulations have restricted the meaning of "securities" to exclude short term notes
(which have close equivalence to cash). See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); BITrER & EusncE, supra note 33, at 3-17. The Treasury has
responded with Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955). When cash or the equivalent of cash is
received in a reorganization, it is treated as "boot," the taxation of which is to be de-
termined by the character of the particular asset. BrrIMER & EusrscE, supra note 33, at
3-20.
76. The inferred analogy between boot and redemption premiums is for the most
part conceptual rather than technical. Were the premium openly identified with boot,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356 would mandate immediate tax liability rather than taxa-
tion during the whole of the preredemption period. However, Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c)
(1973) stipulates this result in certain § 368(a)(1)(E) reorganizations. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7
(c)(1)(ii) (1973) states that in a recapitalization "an increase in a preferred shareholder's
proportionate interest occurs in any case where the fair market value or the liquidation
preference, whichever is greater, of the stock received in the exchange ... exceeds the
issue price of the preferred stock surrendered." Immediate tax consequences follow such
an increase in proportionate interest. Application of these recapitalization provisions to
B or C reorganizations could similarly render as boot a substantial portion of the re-
demption premium.
Determination of the "issue price" of preferred stock issued during a § 368(a)(1)(B) or
(C) reorganization is not clear under the § 305 regulations (of course, fixing the issue
price determines the extent of the premium). Were original issue discount debt rules
followed, Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii)(b) (1972) suggests that issue price equals fair
market value of securities given up in the exchange. Should the indications given by
Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(d) (1973), example (7), be amplified to cover B and C reorganiza-
tions, issue price would equal fair market value of preferred stock immediately after
distribution. Given favorable market conditions immediately following reorganization,
the new version of the proportionate interest doctrine may characterize preferred stock
as boot.
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character of which resembles the payment of dividends and gives rise
to ordinary income.
77
The new original issue discount rules for debt securities themselves
distort the notion of cash equivalence. 78 By forcing the holder of dis-
counted debt to recognize current income on a premium which may
not be received for many years,79 they appear to equate an increased
interest in a redemption premium with the current receipt of cash.
If this concept does not explain the logic of the section, one is left
to conclude that the original issue discount provisions require cash
basis bondholders to accrue income which will be received in a
future tax period. The same observation may be made with greater
force about discounted preferred stock. The new provisions which
tax stockholders currently on a redemption to be received in the
future can be said either to compel cash basis stockholders to accrue
income,80 or to view pro rata annual portions of the premium as
being sufficiently similar to cash currently received so that inclusion
in gross income is required.
In short, there appear to be a number of ways the § 305 regulations
treat discounted preferred stock as though it were a short term debt
interest in a corporation. Not only does such treatment give rise to
several anomalies outlined earlier, it also conflicts, apparently in-
advertently, with the efforts Congress made in other areas of the
Code to distinguish more accurately between debt and equity.
Section 385, which was added to the Code in 1969, gives broad
power to the Treasury8' to issue regulations which will define the
debt or equity status of investment instruments for all purposes of
the Code.82 Congress has suggested that the Treasury include among
77. The Treasury's position seems premised on the notion that the redemption pre-
minum has present value at the time of issuance of the preferred stock. The regulations
may be construed as taking the position that the premium is of no value upon reorgan-
ization, but consists entirely of future dividends. See p. 330 supra. A middle position
is argued at p. 352 infra, that the redemption premium represents dividend income
in part and purchase payment in part; cf. note 73 supra.
78. See generally Landis, supra note 67.
79. Of course the income could be received immediately upon a pre-maturity sale. But
this same argument could be used to justify taxing a distribution of common on com-
mon, as in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
80. Cash basis accounting is codified in INT. REV. CODE or 1954, §§ 446(a), 451(a).
81. At this tinme it would be inaccurate to assert that a sharp debt-equity distinction
has emerged from the Tax Reform Act of 1969. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 385 places a
great deal of responsibility on the Treasury to write regulations which make the debt-
equity distinction. The Treasury has not yet responded to this mandate.
82. Some light has already been shed on the matter. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 279
was enacted in 1969 to give the Treasury a means of denying interest payment deduc-
tion claimed for debt which bears such a substantial risk that it is in fact equity. Four
features must be evident before interest may not be deducted: The purported debt must
be subordinated; there must be a provision for conversion into common; the debt-
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the factors which may be used in these regulations: the existence of
a fixed rate of interest, the existence of a definite promise to repay
principal at a specific maturity date, subordination or preference to
other indebtedness, the debt to equity ratio of the issuer, convertibility
into common, and the relationship between holdings of stock and
holdings of the purported debt.
8 3
Section 385 and related Code provisions clearly envision a risk
standard which will distinguish between debt and equity. According
to this standard, the elements of risk necessary for equity characteriza-
tion are associated to some extent with preferred stock.8 4 Preferred
is subordinated to general creditors, the payment of dividends is con-
tingent upon corporate profits, and holders of preferred bear a sub-
stantially greater risk than holders of indebtedness that the market
price of the security will fall. Nonetheless, the Treasury seemingly
wishes to straddle the fence of taxation when dealing with discounted
preferred, imposing debt status on the shareholders and equity status
on the corporate issuers.8 0 Section 385 could be used more creatively
to solve a number of the problems outlined above.
V. Remedies
Many of the difficulties with the current regulatory scheme may
be circumvented by careful tax planning. Competent tax counsel
equity ratio of the issuer must exceed 2 : 1; and the obligation must have been issued
after October 9, 1969. This provision of the Code is so limited by its terms that it should,
for the purposes of predicting the future scope of § 385, be regarded as the low water
mark of what § 385 could potentially provide. See BiTrKER & EusTicE, supra note 33, at
4-15 to -29. See generally S. REP., supra note 2, at 138-39.
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 385(b). The predictions made in BrlMER & EUSTICE,
supra note 33, at 4-18 n.37, as to "leading candidates for 'super-factor' status" parallel
the suggestions made in the Code by Congress for the most part.
84. But cf. the definition of preferred stock contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(a)
(1973).
85. P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, BAsIc BUSINESS FINANCE 374-78 (3d ed.
1966).
86. Quite possibly Congress will precede the Treasury in correcting the bifurcated
status of preferred stockholders and preferred stock issuers, at least with respect to
preferred stock issued after some future date. In his recent economic proposal President
Ford asked Congress
to enact tax legislation to provide that all dividends on preferred stock issued for
cash be fully deductible by the issuing company. This should bring in more capital,
especially for energy-producing utilities. It will also help other industries shift from
debt to equity, providing a sounder capital structure.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1974, at 24, col. 1. While Ford proposes an effective partial elimina-
tion of the two-tiered system of taxation which taxes corporate income both when
earned by the corporation and again when distributed to the shareholder, he demon-
strates no concern for conceptual clarity. According to this proposal, preferred stock will
continue to be characterized as equity-undoubtedly for the sake of capitalization objec-
tives such as minimizing debt-equity ratios-while little significant tax law distinction
remains. Note that "all dividends" should include constructive dividends on discounted
preferred stock.
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may foresee and avoid problems created by sliding-scale or indeter-
minate term discounted preferred stock, or the thin distinction be-
tween bootstrap financing and a contingent interest. Other problems
are not so easily handled. Short of a decision not to use discounted pre-
ferred at all, even the most sophisticated corporations cannot avoid the
dissonance between imputed dividends and basis adjustments, or the
problem in defining issue price when preferred is issued pursuant to
a merger or acquisition. And it is far from inconceivable that those
small, unsophisticated corporations which have a particular need to
rely on seller-financed consolidations will be trapped by even the
more transparent problems created by the current § 305 regulations.
Since confusion is inevitable under the current structure of taxation
of preferred redemption premiums, some preventive action, even
if it is only the writing of additional regulations or rulings, is clearly
needed.
A. The Courts
Given the Treasury's broad authority under § 305 to issue regu-
lations governing the tax treatment of redemption premiums, courts
will be loath to make substantial inroads on the current regulations.
8 7
However, in the context of mergers and acquisitions the regulations
potentially conflict with basic Code policy regarding' tax-free trans-
fers in acquisitions, 88 and this conflict should give the courts some
freedom to resolve the issue in favor of the taxpayer.
Since § 1.305-5 of the regulations, pertaining to discounted pre-
ferred, does not deal explicitly with corporate combinations, and
since § 1.305-1(c) does allow contingent payments of purchase price
to occur substantially after stock has been exchanged for discounted
preferred, the regulations themselves may be interpreted to exclude
from ordinary income any redemption premiums which are in the
nature of payments for the departing shareholders' capital invest-
ment.8 Alternatively, the courts could act more directly, declaring
87. The standard presumption of correctness could be well supported by INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 305(c), which gives the Treasury authority to prescribe regulations that
identify changes in redemption as a § 301 distribution.
88. Cf. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 354(a)(1); note 75 supra. Broadly stated, absent §
306 tainting, receipt of preferred stock does not breach the continuity of interest prin-
ciple, and is not boot.
89. Under a previous version of Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b)(4) (1973), a conversion ratio
increase on preferred stock would not be considered to be in discharge of a preferred
stock dividend if "such distribution represents an adjustment of the consideration trans-
ferred in the exchange" and the adjustment was made within five years after the ex-
change. CCH 1972 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 2335A, 37 Fed. Reg. 4964 (1972). Current
regulations have not preserved this principle.
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that § 354(b)(1) and the case law90 explicitly prohibit current income
treatment of what is putatively a delay in purchase price.
B. The Treasury and the Congress
In contrast to the courts, the Treasury has a wide range of effective
alternatives that it could pursue to resolve current problems with
discounted preferred stock. Under the broad mandate of § 305(c),
the Treasury is free within wide limits to make whatever further
provisions or revisions it decides would be appropriate. The Treasury's
minimum effort should be to add substance to the current regulations.
Under the present regulatory framework, unless one of the simplified
examples is directly applicable, it is impossible to tell for certain
what will happen to the cost basis of discounted preferred, how the
issue price will be determined, in what magnitude distributions will
be deemed to have been made when there is a partial redemption and
how open-ended redemption plans shall be treated. The silence of the
regulations on this and other similar matters should be broken by
the Treasury.
The regulations under § 305 seem to assume that discounted pre-
ferred is issued during the normal course of business and is not issued
pursuant to a merger or acquisition. When a preferred stock is sold
on the open market at a discount, the amount of the discount may
quite realistically be compared to a dividend payment on a preferred
issue which pays cash yearly and is not discounted. However, in a cor-
porate acquisition the discount may represent in whole or in part
a deferred payment of purchase price.
Regardless of the means used to tax the constructive dividend
element of the preferred's redemption premium, some effort should
be made to segregate out that portion of the redemption premium
which should be taxed at capital gains rates because it represents a
payment of purchase price. Congress has provided the Treasury with
a means of segregating interest charges from payments on capital. 91
It would be reasonable for the Treasury to make use of this pro-
90. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942); Carlberg v. United
States, 281 F. 2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960); James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21 (1964). But see Gordon
v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1970).
91. INT. Rav. CODF OF 1954, § 483. This provision is used to impute the payment of
interest where a capital asset is sold and payment of the purchase price is delayed. By
imputing an interest charge, § 483 prevents the seller from taking interest as a capital
gain rather than as ordinary income, while the buyer is prevented from increasing his
cost basis by the amount of the interest.
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vision, § 483 of the Code, to establish rules by which delayed pur-
chase price could receive the proper capital gains treatment.902
The best course for the Treasury to take would be to decide openly
the extent to which the § 1232 discounted debt analogy should be
applied. Section 385 is the potential vehicle for accomplishing this
goal. Conceivably the yet unwritten regulations under § 385 could
draw the line between debt and equity on either side of discounted
preferred. As a better solution, perhaps only certain types of pre-
ferred should be characterized as debt-for example, discounted pre-
ferred with a definite date of redemption which is supported by a
sinking fund, a specified redemption premium, with no option to
convert to common, and with a high preference in the event of liqui-
dation.93 While this would seem to be an improbable provision un-
der current predictions of the potential scope of § 385, 94 it is not
unreasonable to reevaluate the future of § 385 in light of the ap-
parently unexpected difficulties with § 305 which it could resolve.
Discounted preferred which is nonvoting, has no potential to partici-
pate in corporate growth via a conversion provision, and has the se-
curity of a specific redemption promise, does not bear the risks which
are customarily associated with equity. If the Treasury intends to
describe equity in terms of the risk characteristics of various financial
instruments, it seems reasonable to treat highly secure discounted
preferred as debt.
Should it be decided that some preferred securities are debt while
others are equity, the Treasury should segregate redemption premium
rules according to the two different types of preferred. Present rules
which seem to draw an analogy to original issue discount debt taxation
could be retained to regulate the types of preferred designated as
debt. But for preferred stock which retains equity status, new regu-
lations should be written.
Where preferred stock is to be treated as equity and an ordinary
income result continues to seem desirable as a backstop to § 1232,
92. In defining the term "securities" for the purposes of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
354. leading tax authorities observe that notes with terms of maturity of five years or less
rarely qualify for tax-free status. See Bi-rKER & EUSTICE, supra note 33, at 3-20. Perhaps
the Treasury could articulate a similar test in determining whether equity-status ad-
vantages should accrue to discounted preferred stock. Thus preferred, with a brief period
until redemption, may be considered to be indebtedness for all purposes of the Code, as
governed by rules which are possible to promulgate under § 385.
93. The Court in John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946), agreed
with debt classification of a financial instrument which had priority over common but
was subordinated to other creditors, had free assignability, and a definite maturity date.
These are, of course, features included in many discounted preferred issues.
94. See note 81 supra.
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the tax treatment of preferred stock dividends under § 306 suggests
a useful alternative to the present rules.9; As mentioned above, pre-
ferred stock issued as a dividend on common bears close resemblance
to a cash dividend. Section 306 declares that such stock is tainted,
and when it is disposed of, ordinary income results will usually
follow.96 But this result attaches only upon disposition, in accordance
with cash basis accounting principles. 97 A taxing scheme similar to
§ 306 would permit open-ended characterization which could be em-
ployed in situations where there are sliding-scale redemption pre-
miums, premiums which are increased by cumulated but unpaid div-
idends, or where there is no definite corporate obligation to redeem
the preferred.
Section 305 already follows this "tainting" procedure for preferred
stock which has cumulated dividend arrearages that are discharged
by increasing proportionate interest. 98 Recognizing implicitly that
business reasons, notably the risk involved, do not justify accrual, the
Treasury taxes holders of such stock at ordinary income rates, but
only upon disposition and the receipt of cash. 9 Applying this same
scheme for all redemption premiums would at least eliminate the
need for cash basis taxpayers to accrue uncertain dividends on dis-
counted preferred.
If the courts and the Treasury fail to resolve satisfactorily the cur-
rently bewildering tax treatment of discounted preferred, and if they
do not succeed in restoring cash basis accounting in this field or de-
fining the boundaries of debt and equity, then it would be incumbent
upon Congress to examine carefully the problems which resulted from
the minimum of guidance which § 305(c) gave. Were the legislature
95. Discounted preferred provisions may be directed at the bail-out of earnings and
profits, which parallels the policy basis of § 306, see note 17 supra.
96. There will be ordinary income only to the extent of corporate earnings and prof-
its at the time of issuance of the preferred, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 306(c)(2). In terms
of a risk theory of differentiating debt and equity, it could be said that "section 306
stock" is not taxed as a receipt of cash until the holder alters his risk status through a
redemption or sale.
97. Preferred stock issued during a reorganization generally does not present a direct
problem of earnings and profits bail-out under INT. REXv. CODE OF 1954, § 306. Section 306
recognizes the important principle that during an acquisitive reorganization the ordinary
income result of constructive preferred stock dividend rules is inapplicable because the
new preferred stock is issued as an adjustment of equity interests rather than as a
means of distributing corporate earnings, id. § 306(b). Consequently, the Code provides
that only where preferred stock issued during reorganization has the same effect as a
stock dividend will the stock be tainted as "section 306 stock," id. §§ 306(c)(1)(B), (C).
Therefore any question about capital gains versus ordinary income treatment of dis-
counted preferred typically does not involve § 306 bail-out issues. It is merely a question
of the applicability of general dividend characterization.
98. See notes 39-40 supra.
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7(c) (1973).
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to act, it seems most appropriate that, in order to resolve the pro-
found contradictions created under § 305, the revision be extensive.
Perhaps one source of the current difficulties is the graft of anti-
conglomerate policy onto the tax laws which pertain generally to
corporate financing. If Congress wishes to restrict anticompetitive
conglomerate practices, it would be more appropriate to strengthen
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the FTC, or the
SEC. These departments of the government, and not the Treasury,
have the expertise necessary to police the conglomerates. 100
In all events, Congress should reevaluate the faulty premise that
an increase in redemption price is necessarily the equivalent of pay-
ment of a cash dividend, even where the issuer of discounted pre-
ferred stock is under no obligation to redeem. The Code and the
regulations require a revision which is sufficiently sophisticated to
distinguish between instances where a preferred stockholder has no
power to enforce realization of the retirement provision, and situations
where, by virtue of corporate control, tacit pre-arrangement, or ex-
plicit contract, the holder may demand redemption. 01
Conclusion
Taxation of the redemption premium on discounted preferred
stock has been treated entirely too casually by the Treasury. While
a great deal of energy has beerl devoted to original issue discount
indebtedness, as evidenced by the elaborate provisions of § 1232
in both Code and regulations, redemption premiums on preferred
were dealt with lightly. Congress left the details up to the Treasury,
and the Treasury was content to make very scant provision, explained
for the most part by example alone. It is apparent that the rules
dealing with discounted preferred were written as a backstop to § 1232,
designed to prevent taxpayers from using preferred stock to gain
back-door access to recently prohibited original issue discount in-
vestment results.
Where a particular kind of preferred stock is judged to be so anal-
ogous to original issue discount indebtedness that equity advantages
should not be permitted, it follows that under the authority granted
the Treasury by § 385 the preferred should be characterized as debt
100. See lBittker, supra note 3.
101. Congress may have occasion to consider the taxation of preferred stock dividends
in the very near future. While attention will focus on the issuer's side of the equation,
stockholder problems might be reviewed. See note 86 supra.
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for all purposes of the Code. However, where a preferred stock's de-
gree of risk or participation in the growth and management of a
corporation does not warrant debt treatment, the stock's equity charac-
ter should be consistently respected. Deemed dividends on a preferred
stock issue which is identified as equity should not be treated as a
cash equivalent and taken immediately into income. The transaction
should instead be treated as open-ended. Preferred stock bail-out rules
under § 306, and § 305 provisions for cumulated dividend arrearages
establish the principle that deemed dividends, when represented by
increased holdings of equity, might well be taxed as ordinary income,
but not until such equity is converted into cash. This principle ap-
plies equally to deemed dividends represented by redemption pre-
miums.
Furthermore, where it can be demonstrated that all or part of a re-
demption premium represents a deferred payment of purchase price
in a merger or acquisition, there is no justification for treating the
premium (or the portion of it representing capital) as productive
of current ordinary income. This treatment results in the anomaly of
taxing a payment on purchase of a capital asset as a payment of a
dividend, and it violates the principle that recognition of tax liability
should be delayed in a merger or acquisition until equity assets are
converted into cash or cash equivalents.
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